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Do universal truths about war exist? When does the immutable become, well, 
mutable? Rethinking warfighting fundamentals 
like the principles of war raises such questions. 
sadly, what is enduring about war is its relentless, 
tragic horror.
Other aspects of the human dimension also 
remain unchanged. The apprehension and determi-
nation a young Marine feels on the battlefield today 
are the same as the young Athenian felt on the Plain 
of Marathon in 490 B.C. Yet it is equally true that 
social, economic, political, and technological fac-
tors evolve war’s practice if not its essence. 
The traditional principles of war describe, as one 
document puts it, “those aspects of warfare that are 
universally true and relevant.”1 today they typically 
include unity of command, objective, offensive, 
mass, maneuver, economy of force, security, sur-
prise, and simplicity.2 over the ages the list has 
varied somewhat because what is common in one 
era might be rare or absent altogether in another. The 
necessity for recalibrations from time to time simply 
reflects the humanness (if not humanity) of war.
The Modernized Principles  
of War 
Modernizing the traditional principles of war for 
21st-century conflicts does not render older versions 
irrelevant. To the contrary, the intent of modern-
izing the principles of war is to capture the spirit 
of existing ones. For example, informed insight, 
when properly understood, incorporates elements 
of security and surprise. Likewise, the modernized 
principles of war such as perceived worthiness, 
informed insight, strategic anchoring, engage-
ment dominance, unity of effect, adaptability, and 
culminating power strive to capture the essential 
objective, among other traditional principles. In 
short, the aim is not wholesale replacement of the 
traditional principles, per se, but rather a renovation 
that is conscious of the lasting value of the old.
Perceived worthiness. Why men fight and why 
they stop fighting are the classic inquiries of military 
thinkers. Ultimately, the answer is about worthiness. 
What makes it worthwhile for people to risk their 
lives in armed combat? What persuades them to 
make the enormous sacrifices war can require? For 
some, it is high-minded purposes such as achiev-
ing or preserving freedom. For others, it concerns 
personal honor, comradeship, or simply survival. 
Worthiness goes to the fundamental mindset of 
people both individually and collectively. 
Assuming that worthiness necessarily equates to 
moral good is a mistake, however. Various groups 
might conclude that ethnic hatred, lebensraum 
(living space), or any number of malevolent ration-
ales add up to acceptable motivators for violence. 
Worthiness is a matter of subjective perspective, not 
objective merit. What is important is what a bellig-
erent believes warrants war. Hence, this principle 
appends “perceived” to the idea of worthiness.
Thoughtful theorists suggest that the related 
concept of will should become a principle of war 
because overcoming an opponent’s resolve is the 
central task of war.3 in key respects, it is always a 
center of gravity. Although will has ready touch-
stones in military literature, perceived worthiness 
peels it back to address its underpinnings. For the 
warfighter, it literally asks the right question, the 
“why” of an antagonist’s hostility. Opportunity lies 
in the answer. Sufficiently erode the perception of 
worthiness among decisive elements of an adver-
sary’s combat power, and the effort disintegrates, 
even if the physical capability to continue remains 
intact. Conversely, when it collapses among friendly 
forces, defeat likely follows. 
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Most opponents of the United States no 
longer pursue traditional military victory, per 
se. Instead, they try to get us to perceive that 
the goal no longer justifies the anticipated sac-
rifice of American blood and treasure. This is 
why managing perceptions among friend and 
foe is so important to 21st-century conflicts. 
to create the right perceptions, leaders need 
informed insight.
Informed insight. Informed insight seeks 
to make sense of the cacophony that swirls 
around concepts like information superiority 
and dominance. Suffused with the notion that 
more is always better, investments pour into 
various collection capabilities in an insatiable 
drive to accumulate information. While it is 
necessary to cast a wide net to ensure one is 
fully informed, warfighters need more than 
raw data, however voluminous.
Fusing information is the real challenge. It is not 
just gleaning relevant data from the mass; it is appre-
ciating the human factors of information convey-
ance. How much can a commander usefully absorb 
and at what rate? Unless information is digested, it is 
as if it does not exist. That said, even comprehensive 
and well-fused reports will not, alone, produce the 
winning information differential. 
The reasons are several. Digitization of data of all 
kinds makes plenty of militarily useful information 
freely available on the Web. In the future if anything 
exists in an electrical form, we must assume it is 
in the hands of the adversary. Moreover, technol-
ogy such as Web crawlers, intelligent robots, and 
other relatively inexpensive autonomous means 
will likely do much of the fusing work. Third-party 
corporations already exist to fuse information for 
anyone for a price.
All of these developments will level the battlefield 
informationwise. Consequently, in many situations, 
warfighters should not waste time on the quixotic 
task of trying to achieve information superiority or 
dominance. Rather, they ought to develop doctrines 
and strategies for fighting in an environment of 
complete information transparency.
Authenticity will be the critical feature of infor-
mation in 21st-century warfare. Manipulating and 
altering data, including images that exist electroni-
cally, is just too easy. Although technology itself 
might provide some solutions, the side that quickly 
verifies the legitimacy of information will have a 
significant edge. A new-style fog of war will mark 
modern conflicts as vast quantities of cleverly mis-
leading data and outright disinformation flood deci-
sion centers and threaten to bury genuine facts.
the true asymmetric advantage does not come 
from information accumulation, but from the cog-
nitive component of the warfighter. The insights 
drawn from information make the real difference. 
Data, no matter how all-encompassing, well-fused, 
or timely, cannot provide insight, which is not just 
knowing what the enemy is thinking and saying, 
but intuiting what he will think and do even before 
he knows. Thus, informed insight can capture a 
conventional principle like surprise and employ it 
offensively or defensively. 
How does one acquire insight? The answer is 
experience and native talent combined with a wide-
scoped liberal education, formally or informally 
acquired. These, coupled with a solid technologi-
cal orientation and complemented by exhaustive 
study of all aspects of a foe’s specific situation, 
can produce, if not wisdom, at least more astute 
evaluations.
The ability to focus matters. Napoleon spent 
hours alone deliberating about his battle plans. Time 
and again, this technique produced brilliant military 
insights. Obviously, the speed of modern warfare 
limits emulation of Napoleon’s technique, but tech-
nology and behavioral studies might produce useful 
approaches. A distributed analytical process that 
links and synergizes the mental muscle of disparate 
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leadership elements is yet another possibility for 
exploration. Nonetheless, the innate military genius 
of individuals still counts. That genius, however, 
must have firm strategic anchoring.
Strategic anchoring. strategic anchoring means 
consciously anchoring every action in a strategic con-
text. The principle recasts the objective to highlight 
the potential the information revolution gives to all 
combatant actions. The traditional notion of objec-
tive is constituent to strategic anchoring because 
activities so connected automatically coalesce on the 
right goal at any level of war. In the Information Age, 
few objectives are exclusively tactical or operational, 
or even military. Each has latent strategic implica-
tions, some of profound importance.
General Charles C. Krulak’s conceptualization of 
the strategic corporal epitomizes this phe-
nomenon.4 actions at the tactical level, 
including even those of the ordinary 
corporal, overlooked in previous 
conflicts, can have far-reaching 
effects. The stunning strategic 
effect of the misconduct of a 
few low-ranking soldiers at Abu 
Ghraib prison amply illustrates 
Krulak’s point. The scandal 
was a defeat in every sense of 
the word except, perhaps, the 
traditional kinetic one. Intention-
ally organizing actions around 
strategic purposes is essential.
In 21st-century conflicts, how we 
fight can determine if (and what) we 
win. Unfortunately, absent firm strategic 
anchoring, concentration on the objective encour-
ages an unproductive fixation on short-term ends in 
isolation from other imperatives. The notion of “we 
had to burn the village in order to save it” typifies 
the problem. Globalized information systems can 
rapidly create adverse political effects from military 
actions, even actions that fit customary notions of 
victory. Accordingly, leaders must consciously 
shape even seemingly minor actions to account for 
the strategic potential each possesses.
strategic anchoring takes issue with the promi-
nence of the offensive in popular military thought. 
Unbridled obsession with an undifferentiated view 
of the offensive is dangerous.5 Of course, restraining 
undisciplined offensive impulses is not the same as 
endorsing passivity. An active defensive that inflicts 
persistent stress on challengers while shrewdly 
avoiding unintended consequences deserves equal 
billing with the offensive. Linking all actions to 
their strategic anchor best accomplishes that aim. 
Durability readily informs the efficacy and relevance 
of strategic anchoring.
Durability. Much of the value of durability as 
a modernized principle of war resides in its exqui-
site lucidity. Durability reflects the basic idea of 
continuing utility for the intended purpose despite 
hard use. In the military context, durability extends 
from the immediately practical to entire strategic 
themes. Along the way, the tenet subsumes several 
traditional principles. For example, modern com-
manders who are thinking durability will naturally 
incorporate security into their planning.
Pundits quip that amateurs talk strategy 
and professionals talk logistics. What 
is clearly axiomatic is that durabil-
ity depends on logistics. Conse-
quently, the side that solves the 
vexing logistical issues intrinsic 
to modern warfare will reap 
a huge return. Consider how 
influential a scientific break-
through that provides power 
sources to quench burgeoning 
(and burdensome) fuel demands 
could be. If human-nourishment 
requirements are lessened, possibly 
through advances in biotechnology, 
force durability would be dramatically 
enhanced. Of course, seeking to disrupt the 
often-voracious logistics of militaries endures as 
a feature of modern conflicts.
Durability is more than mere physical sustain-
ment, however; it extends to strategy. Military 
commanders from Xenophon to George Washington 
to Mao Tse-tung appreciated that a force durable 
enough to maintain existence is, in itself, a strategy 
that precludes one’s rival from attaining victory. 
adversaries, especially irregulars, continue to 
attempt to draw out conflicts in the hopes of exhaust-
ing seemingly more powerful foes. 
Nevertheless, past successes of similar strategies 
will be increasingly difficult to replicate. In a netted 
world that illuminates virtually every phone call, 
every financial transaction, and every plane flight, 
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anonymity is becoming harder to achieve. Covertly 
sustaining logistics even for relatively low-demand 
insurgent operations will not be easy. In particular, 
obtaining advanced medical care surreptitiously 
might be nearly impossible. Carefully studying the 
implications of durability on an adversary might 
be the greatest source of fresh solutions to thorny 
military problems.
another important durability consideration is 
that technology of all kinds now reaches even the 
remotest areas of the world and is quickly spawning 
generations addicted to it. Accordingly, a “death 
of a thousand cuts” strategy might profit those 
who exploit such a habituation because even small 
techno-encumbrances can accumulate into debilitat-
ing friction. Taking advantage of superior resources 
to produce redundancies and alternatives, as well as 
steeling one’s own forces to technology loss, is fast 
becoming essential to force durability.
In modern conflicts, durability requires extraor-
dinary mental toughness. Persevering in the face 
of the enormous stress the lethality of modern 
battlefields produces, withstanding increasingly 
sophisticated psychological warfare, and tolerating 
extreme deprivation place a huge premium on pro-
fessionalism, especially discipline. Winning forces 
must be disciplined and confident, and few things 
enhance troop confidence more than engagement 
dominance.
Engagement dominance. the theory behind 
engagement dominance is not complicated. Begin-
ning with David’s defeat of Goliath, military history 
graphically demonstrates the value of this often 
overlooked principle. The concept calls for striking 
an opponent with impunity by outranging, outgun-
ning, or even outwitting him through deception and 
surprise. The fearsome 14-foot pikes of Alexander’s 
phalanxes killed thousands of short-sworded infan-
trymen before they could land a blow; English 
bowmen destroyed the flower of French knighthood 
from long distance at Crécy; and during the first Gulf 
War, American tanks simply outranged Iraqi T-72s to 
win a crushing victory at the Battle of 73 Easting. 
obtaining engagement-dominating technol-
ogy is complicated, however. Although everyone 
intuitively appreciates that advanced warfighting 
hardware can separate winners from losers, too 
many assume that all technology is an unqualified 
“good.” The result? Confusion about such critically 
important but intricate concepts as transformation, 
system of systems, battlespace awareness, and 
more. Worse, research and development (R&D) 
efforts diffuse wastefully into solutions in search 
of problems. Replicating engagement dominance’s 
past triumphs requires orienting sufficient R&D 
toward the overarching problem of war: preempt-
ing or disrupting an opponent’s ability to bring his 
weapons to bear.
Another aspect of the engagement-dominance 
solution is methodological. Employing weaponry 
at the right time is as, or more, important than the 
sophistication of the equipment itself. This calls 
for processes that allow commanders to get inside 
the enemy’s observe, orient, decide, act cycle that 
applies combat power.6 using superior capabilities 
effectively to seize the initiative and to deny it to the 
foe produces engagement dominance. Furthermore, 
engagement dominance incorporates and simplifies 
maneuver and can impose or oppose surprise. It even 
results from the actions of third parties through the 
orchestration of unity of effect.
Unity of effect. The traditional principles of war 
speak of unity of command with its implicit assump-
tion of direction and control. What really counts in 
war, however, are effects, however obtained. While 
putting available resources into a workable chain of 
command always helps, leveraging that which is 
beyond command and control is especially valuable. 
Unity of effect, therefore, reinterprets economy of 
force and even mass and maneuver by accentuat-
ing results.
Examples of leveraging the uncontrollable are 
many. Weather has long created effects with military 
implications. For example, during the second Gulf 
War commanders destroyed republican Guard units 
by exploiting the fatal assumption by Iraqi leaders 
that sandstorms made armor movements invisible 
to airpower. Throughout history, warfighters have 
Ultimately, war is still an art, and like 
all artistic endeavors, human imagination 
will continue to drive inventive forms and 
executions of its subject. In a sense, the most 
basic of the principles of war is the need to 
constantly challenge, reevaluate, and mod-
ernize all of them. The job is never done. 
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also obtained positive results from the savvy use of 
geography, even though they enjoyed no dominion 
over it. 
Deriving operational effects from third-party activi-
ties is especially important in modern conflicts. The 
Madrid train bombings, which occurred shortly before 
the Spanish elections in 2004, represent a clever 
(albeit heartless) illustration. The bombings influ-
enced voters as intended, and the new government 
withdrew its troops from Iraq. The practical effect 
was indistinguishable from a traditional defeat: The 
combat power of 1,400 Spanish soldiers was lost.
Obtaining advantage from the actions of dispar-
ate, proxy groups is a force multiplier. Proxies in 
modern warfare might not always realize their role. 
For many reasons, warring groups might have no 
formal or even informal connection with entities 
that produce effects that nevertheless serve their 
interests. Alliances of the unknowing will exist, and 
the skillful use of Internet appeals for action is but 
one example of how they might form.
Consensus-building optimizes unity of effect. 
Even where a unified command structure allegedly 
exists, pragmatic commanders might still find per-
suasive skills the most valued implement in their 
warfighting toolkit. Modern warfighting effects, not 
the niceties of wiring diagrams, are the coins of the 
realm. Achieving unity of effect will require a great 
deal of forward-thinking adaptability. 
Adaptability. Adaptability is a hallmark of the 
American way of war. During World War II, inno-
vative american soldiers bolted homemade plows 
onto tanks to cut through hedgerows frustrating 
the breakout from Normandy. During the Korean 
War General Douglas McArthur’s Inchon landings 
were an operational-level adaptation to a battlefield 
impasse. The spirit lives on: During the second Gulf 
War, Soldiers adapted to the threat of improvised 
explosive devices and small arms fire by welding 
“hillbilly armor” to their vehicles. 
adaptability better explains commonly miscon-
strued concepts like asymmetric warfare, which is 
nothing more than adapting warfighting means and 
methods to apply one’s strengths against an oppo-
nent’s weakness. Adaptability presupposes flex-
ibility, but it does not mandate simplicity. Indeed, 
complexity breeds lucrative opportunities. Adapta-
tion that employs high technology and requires 
trained, disciplined troops is difficult to counter. 
Linking a handful of Special Forces with aircraft 
overhead to produce real-time precision bombing 
is a complicated adaptive response that broke years 
of stalemate on Afghanistan battlefields.
BG Courtney Whitney; GEN Douglas MacArthur, Com-
mander in Chief of U.N. Forces; and MG Edward M. 
Almond observe the shelling of Inchon from the U.S.S.  
Mt. McKinley, 15 September 1950. 
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An M-4 Sherman tank with a “rhino plow” attached in front 
has just punched its way through a Normandy hedgerow. 
Note the infantrymen riding on the back of the tank. 
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SGT Clay O’Dell, 3-112th Armor Battalion, 56th Brigade 
Combat Team, 36th Infantry Division, welds a 3/8-inch 
steel armor plate on a HMMWV in southern Iraq. 
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Encouraging the creative instincts of subordinates 
is vital, as is an organizational culture friendly to 
rapid implementation of adaptive ideas. At the same 
time, however, inappropriately reflexive adaptations 
fail. Some out-of-the-box ideas are deservedly off-
the-table; others need more development. Consider 
the Jeune Ecole’s (young school’s) advocacy of tor-
pedo boats as the French Navy’s adaptive response 
to the capital ships of other European powers of 
the late 19th century. Despite presaging submarine 
warfare, the movement prematurely dismissed the 
importance of battleships and did not anticipate the 
emergence of aircraft carriers.
In modern conflicts, prized leadership qualities 
include the ability to rapidly sort through propos-
als as well as tolerance for the risks inherent to 
adaptation. Naturally, adaptability aims to produce 
culminating power.
Culminating power. The concept of culminating 
power answers the question: What type and measure 
of military (or other) power is needed to attain satis-
factory closure at a given level of conflict? Ordinarily, 
the answer would be “enough,” either to annihilate 
one’s adversary or to make him perceive that contin-
ued resistance is not worthwhile. Culminating power 
encompasses elements of the traditional principles of 
war, such as offensive, mass, maneuver, and economy 
of force, without explicitly requiring any of them. 
What constitutes adequate culminating power 
depends on the situation. Surprisingly, at the stra-
tegic level it could involve a classic decisive battle. 
Such engagements are not passé; the fall of Stanley 
effectively ended the 1980 Falklands/Malvinas War, 
and the fall of Kandahar collapsed Taliban power 
in 2003. Future commanders might well impose a 
Dien Bien Phu effect on selected adversaries with 
great success.
Misunderstanding culminating power is easy 
today. Although conventional North Vietnamese 
divisions led the final assault on Saigon in 1975, 
that conflict, along with many of the post-World 
War II colonial wars, produced the widespread belief 
that guerrilla operations render orthodox militaries 
almost wholly irrelevant. Actually, low-intensity 
warfare usually succeeds only in the absence of 
high-intensity risk to a major power’s fundamen-
tal security interests. True, insurgents in several 
colonial conflicts did force their opponents to tally 
the worth of fighting. Typically, the potential gains 
could not offset the investment needed to acquire 
enough culminating power to win. (Given the dismal 
economic performance of most former colonies, the 
calculations were largely accurate.) 
Even in conflicts driven by ideology, such as Viet-
nam, a party will eventually objectively compute what 
it would have to do to conclude the conflict success-
fully. When it became clear that South Vietnam was not 
moving toward an effective democratic government, 
the American people calculated that the effort was not 
worthy of continued support given the costs.7
 regardless, when the stakes are higher, the 
arithmetic of culminating power differs radically, 
which is important in the zero-sum game of national 
security budgetary battles. Of significance is that 
neither Iraqi insurgents nor Al Qaeda terrorists can 
acquire sufficient culminating power to threaten the 
united states’ basic security interest—america’s 
continued existence as a free nation. 
Terrorists can wreak savage injury—especially 
using weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—but 
only a peer competitor with a sizeable WMD capa-
bility can imperil America’s survival. This should 
give pause to those who ridicule so-called legacy 
systems such as attack and ballistic missile subma-
rines, nuclear-capable bombers and missiles, and 
show-stopping weapons like the F-22A. As impor-
tant as defeating terrorism and other low-intensity 
forms of warfare might be, considerations of the 
larger context must guide decisionmaking.
Guideposts for the Future
Modernized principles of war could serve as 
guideposts (but not stop signs) for military and civil-
ian leaders embroiled in 21st-century conflicts. Such 
principles could aid the conduct of war and assist 
in organizing, training, and equipping for the same. 
When appropriately interrelated, the modernized 
principles suggest ways to strengthen friendly forces 
and indicate vulnerabilities in enemy operations. Of 
course, the best commanders will deviate from the 
principles as the fortunes of war dictate. Moreover, 
the modernized principles will inevitably evolve. 
ultimately, war is still an art, and like all artistic 
endeavors, human imagination will continue to 
drive inventive forms and executions of its subject. 
In a sense, the most basic of the principles of war 
is the need to constantly challenge, reevaluate, and 
modernize all of them. The job is never done.
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In security matters, intellectual stasis could be fatal. 
The great danger today, for example, is assuming that the 
irregular warfare of current conflicts is the inescapable 
template for future wars. (Is occupying another sullen 
and hostile population really the likeliest scenario?)
Finally, we must continue to search for peace 
even as we prepare for war. We can hope that the 
melancholy belief that “only the dead have seen the 
end of war” is wrong, so long as we always realize 
that hope is not a principle of war.8 MR
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NOTES
Early Risers
Across the dim parade field that foregrounds
the vista, crows in fir trees wrought like spires
watch barracks wake in synchronous lighting
where young men rouse to demands for order.
They move out in rows of compliant minds,
their last letters from home held close in thought— 
each caring word faithful to cadenced steps
as crows rise, scatter, and merge into clouds.
—Major Jeffrey Alfiers, USAF
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